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We examine the link between the monitoring capacity of the board
and corporate performance of UK listed firms. We also investigate
how firms use the flexibility offered by the voluntary governance
regime to make governance choices. We find a strong positive asso-
ciation between the board governance index we construct and firm
operating performance. Our results imply that adherence to the
board-related recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance
Code strengthens the board's monitoring capacity, potentially help-
ing mitigate agency problems, but that investors do not value it cor-
respondingly. Moreover, in contrast to prior UK findings suggesting
efficient adoption of Code recommendations, we find that firms at
times use the Code flexibility opportunistically, aiming to decrease
the monitoring capacity of the board, which is followed by subse-
quent underperformance. This finding questions the effectiveness of
the voluntary approach to governance regulation followed in the UK
and inmany countries around the world.
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1 INTRODUCTION
According to agency theorists, there are two main functions of the board: decision management, i.e. initiation and
implementation of decisions, and decision control, i.e. ratification and monitoring of decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983).
The UK Corporate Governance Code (henceforth, the Code) reflects this distinction by stating that “[c]orporate gov-
ernance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled” and “[b]oards of directors are responsible for the
governance of their companies” (Financial Reporting Council, 2016, p. 1). While the primary responsibility for provid-
ing direction that is “setting the strategic aims of the company” and “providing the leadership to put them into effect”
(Financial Reporting Council, 2016, p. 1), i.e. decision management, rests with managers (i.e. executive directors), the
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primary responsibility for decision control or “supervising the management of the business” (Financial Reporting Council,
2016, p. 1), i.e. monitoring, rests with outside directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983), termed independent non-executive
directors by the Code. From its inception in the form of the Cadbury Report in 1992, the Code, implicitly draw-
ing on the insights from agency theory, has encouraged firms to strengthen the monitoring capacity of their boards.
This is to be achieved by avoiding CEO-Chair duality and by promoting independence of the board and its key mon-
itoring committees. Hence, in theory, one can expect greater adherence to the Code's board-related recommenda-
tions to be associated with reduced agency problems, and hence superior operating performance and firm value (cf.
Adams, Hermalin, &Weisbach, 2010; Renders, Gaeremynck, & Sercu, 2010). This is the first proposition tested in this
study.
The Code is based on the principle of voluntary compliance andmandatory disclosure. Hence, the second andmore
novel question we address in this study is how the flexibility in the choice of governance arrangements offered by
the Code is used. It has been argued that the underlying reason for the flexibility offered by the voluntary nature of
the Code is to allow for sound deviations from recommendations where these are warranted (Arcot, Bruno, & Faure-
Grimaud, 2010). While the emphasis of the Code is on strengthening the monitoring capacity of the board (as per
agency theory: Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), there is also an implicit recognition that there may
be times when the directing, i.e. what agency theorists consider the decision initiation and implementation capacity
of the board (Fama & Jensen, 1983), may need to be strengthened. A voluntary approach to governance favoured by
regulators in the UK as in many other countries (European Corporate Governance Institute, 2017), puts power in the
hands of the corporate board to choose its structure and composition as it deems appropriate at a particular point
in time (MacNeil & Li, 2006). Hence, firms may deviate from full adherence to boost the board's directing capacity.
For instance, they may aim to strengthen the leadership structure by combining the CEO and chair positions (Donald-
son & Davis, 1991). They may induct more insiders or non-independent outsiders (like past employees) on the board.
Such individuals, by virtue of possessing firm-specific knowledge, may then play a more effective advisory role, thus
assisting managerial decision making (Fahlenbrach, Minton, & Pan, 2011; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Klein, 1998). Based
on the above rationale, we first argue that the weakening of board monitoring capacity, if driven by efficiency rea-
sons, should be associated with subsequent superior firm performance. Alternatively, if driven by managerial self-
interest (as per agency theory; Jensen&Meckling, 1976), reductions in boardmonitoring capacity shouldbe associated
with subsequent underperformance.We examine the evidence to discern which of these two alternative propositions
holds.
To test our hypotheses we develop a board governance index which captures the overall monitoring capacity
of the board and is based on the extent of adherence to the Code's key board-related recommendations. Prior
international evidence shows that the strengthening of the board independence and reduction of duality (consis-
tent with the Code recommendations) are generally associated with a more effective board oversight function (e.g.
Beasley, 1996; Boeker & Goodstein, 1991; Chan & Li, 2008; Conyon & Peck, 1998; Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999;
Dahya, McConnell, & Travlos, 2002; Weisbach, 1988; Yeh, Chung, & Liu, 2011). Hence the board governance index
we develop is rooted in agency theory predictions (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and is supported by relevant empirical
evidence.
Employing a large panel dataset on board characteristics of UK listed companies spanning the years 1999–2008,
we find a strong positive association between the board governance index and various measures of a firm's operating
performance. This finding implies that stronger monitoring capacity is likely associated with better oversight function
and hence better operating performance. This result challenges some of the prior UK findings (e.g. Arcot et al., 2010;
Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Weir, Laing, & McKnight, 2002). However, consistent in essence with prior US evidence
on the governance–performance link (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003), we find that investors in the UK also do not
seem to be recognising the value of governance: subsequent stock returns are higher for firms with stronger board
monitoring arrangements.
In terms of the second set of competing propositions, we find decreases in the board governance index to be associ-
atedwith highermanagerial power and higher information asymmetries. This gives a first indication regarding the pos-
sible motive, namely managerial opportunism (cf. Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008).
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Next, we find such decreases to be associated with inferior subsequent firm performance. This finding lends further
support to the managerial opportunism hypothesis (cf. Bowen, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam, 2008). Finally, we find that
board governance index decreases are most often due to weakening of the independence of the key board monitoring
committees, in particular the remuneration and audit committees. Taken together, this body of evidence suggests that
firms tend to make opportunistic use of Code flexibility. These findings are inconsistent with the efficient use of Code
flexibility suggested by some prior UK evidence (e.g. Hillier &McColgan, 2006; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2003; Young,
2000). It also calls into question the effectiveness of the self-regulatory approach advocated by the promulgators of
the Code (cf. MacNeil & Li, 2006).
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Board governance and firm performance
While there are a range of governance mechanisms that can help align managerial and shareholder interests, the cor-
porate board is not only considered the ultimate internal monitor (Adams et al., 2010; Fama & Jensen, 1983), but it
also remains at the centre of governance reforms in the UK, as indeed in code-based systems of corporate governance
around the world (Arcot et al., 2010; European Corporate Governance Institute, 2017). Therefore, our focus on the
board and its monitoring capacity is rooted in theory and relevant from a policy perspective. Following the seminal
work of Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) on agency theory, a large body of theoretical and
empiricalwork has examined the effectiveness of various elements of the board's structure and composition in deliver-
ing good corporate governance and superior financial performance (seeAdamset al., 2010, for a review). In the interest
of brevity, we limit our discussion here to only those studies that are most relevant to our focus on corporate boards
and the board-related recommendations of the Code.
2.1.1 Duality, governance and firm performance
A number of scholars have studied the role of the leadership structure at the top, i.e. combining of the CEO and chair
position (duality) in delivering or otherwise, good governance and superior firm performance. The results are largely
mixed. While some studies find a positive relation of duality with firm performance consistent with the view that by
empoweringmanagers, duality helps speedupdecisionmaking and focus accountability (e.g.Donaldson&Davis, 1991),
others find that by empowering managers it leads to managerial entrenchment thus contributing to weak governance
and firm performance (e.g. Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001; Core et al., 1999). The latter view is also implicit in the UK
Code's key recommendation of splitting the CEO and chair positions. Yet other studies find no link between duality
and various market-based measures of firm performance (e.g. for the US: Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997; for the UK:
Dahya, Garcia, & van Bommel, 2009; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; and Weir et al., 2002). Moreover, Dedman (2000)
finds that older CEOs with longer tenures and higher firm equity ownership are less likely to comply with the Code
recommendation of splitting CEO-chair roles. Hence, while evidence on the link of duality with firm performance is
mixed, duality appears tohelp entrenchmanagement, thus providing support for theCode recommendationof splitting
the CEO and chair roles.
2.1.2 Board independence, monitoring committee independence, governance and firm
performance
According to Fama and Jensen (1983) and Hermalin andWeisbach (1998), the primary responsibility for board over-
sight (including hiring, firing and compensating of the top managers) rests with the outside directors, i.e. independent
non-executive directors (henceforth NEDs) on corporate boards. Due to their reputational concerns in the manage-
rial and directorial labour markets, such NEDs are expected to perform an effective oversight function via their ade-
quate representation on the board and its key monitoring committees, i.e. the remuneration, audit and nomination
committees.
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While the evidence on the link between board independence and firm performance is mixed (cf. Brown & Caylor,
2006; Bhagat & Black, 1999; Dahya & McConnell, 2007; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002), many studies
find that independent directors perform an effective oversight function. For instance, Weisbach (1988) and Dahya
et al. (2002) find a higher sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor firm performance in companies with more indepen-
dent boards, while Core et al. (1999) find less independent boards to be associated with lower pay–performance
sensitivity. Moreover, Boeker and Goodstein (1991) find lower likelihood of CEOs being replaced by outsiders in
insider-dominated boards.
However, it is not simply board independence that matters. The evidence suggests that board governance effec-
tiveness often goes hand in hand with the quality and independence of key board monitoring committees (Chan & Li,
2008; Yeh et al., 2011). For instance, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) show that when CEOs serve on the nominating
committee or when there is no such committee, fewer independent directors are appointed. They interpret this
finding as evidence of powerful CEOs being able to influence the structure of the board. Moreover, Beasley (1996)
finds a lower probability of fraud on boards with more independent audit committees, while Conyon and Peck
(1998) document that managerial compensation is more performance-sensitive in companies with more independent
remuneration committees.
In sum, while the evidence on the association between various separate dimensions of board governance arrange-
ments and corporate performance is somewhat mixed, both the predictions of agency theory (e.g. Fama & Jensen,
1983) and the extant empirical evidence suggest that adoption of board structure and composition as recommended
by the Code (and captured by the board governance index) have the potential to strengthen the oversight function of
theboard and thus, in theory, should be associatedwith superior firmperformance. Accordingly,wehypothesise that:
H1: Higher values of the board governance index are associated with higher firm operating performance andmar-
ket value.
2.2 Antecedents and consequences of the changes in the board governance index
The flexibility offered by the voluntary nature of the Code is meant to allow the board to deviate from full compliance
(with board-related recommendations) where such deviation is warranted (Arcot et al., 2010). Extant literature on the
determinants of board structure and composition starting from Fama and Jensen (1983), followed by Hermalin and
Weisbach (1988, 1998) through to the more recent work of Boone et al. (2007), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008, and
Linck et al. (2008) argues and finds that the representation of insiders versus outsiders on the board, usually termed as
board independence, is an outcome of the negotiations between themanagers and the non-executive directors on the
board (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). These negotiations and their board outcomes are influenced by two factors, i.e.
the relative power of managers vis-à-vis NEDs and outsiders (Boone et al., 2007; Hermalin &Weisbach, 1988, 1998),
and the perceived costs and benefits of monitoring by the board (Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Hermalin &
Weisbach, 1998; Linck et al., 2008).
Given that managers would inherently prefer lower monitoring (Hermalin &Weisbach, 1998), boards where man-
agerial power is high are likely to lower its monitoring capacity, perhaps by outright reduction of the proportion of
independent directors or, more tacitly, by reducing the independence of its key monitoring committees. The oppor-
tunistic motives driving such decreases in the board governance index could be further inferred from subsequent firm
underperformance (Bowen et al., 2008; Core et al., 1999).Managerial power has beenmeasured in the literature using
a number of variables including past firm performance (i.e. stronger past operating performance, higher managerial
power, cf. Boone et al., 2007; Hermalin &Weisbach, 1998), CEO shareholdings (higher shareholdings implying greater
power, Boone et al., 2007; Core et al., 1999), and CEO age. Prior evidence shows that older CEOs tend to have higher
equity ownership, longer tenures and are less likely to complywith theCode (Dedman, 2000). They are alsomore likely
to fill the board seats with insiders (Boone et al., 2007; Hermalin &Weisbach, 1988; Linck et al., 2008).
The perceived costs and benefits of monitoring are largely influenced by the level of information asymme-
try between the managers and the non-executive directors (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). The higher the level of
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information asymmetry, the higher the perceived costs of monitoring (or, alternatively, the higher the benefits of
stronger directing).1 Accordingly, the boardmay choose to lower itsmonitoring capacity bybecoming less independent
(say by outright reduction of the number of independent directors) or it may aim to strengthen its directing capacity
by inducting more insiders (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Harris & Raviv, 2008; Klein, 1998) or other affiliated directors such
as past employees, who by virtue of their superior firm-specific knowledge can help strengthen the board's directing
capacity (Fahlenbrach et al., 2011; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Boards may even strengthen the leadership structure by
combining the CEO and chair positions (Brickley et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). All such actions, if driven by
efficiency reasons, should be associated with subsequent superior firm performance (cf. Bowen et al., 2008).
Based on the preceding discussion we posit the following competing hypotheses:
H2a: Decreases in board governance index are associated with subsequent superior firm performance (relative to
the control group).
H2b: Decreases in board governance index are associated with subsequent inferior firm performance (relative to
the control group).
Finding support for H2a would be indicative of the efficiency motives, while support for H2b would be consistent
with the opportunistic rationale. To test the above hypotheses, we first examine the factors associated with the likeli-
hood of changes in the board governance index. We then examine the subsequent performance implications of index
decreases employing the propensity score matching approach. As a final test, we also examine which components of
the index are adjustedmost often by firms for which the board governance index decreases.
We specifically focus on index decreases since these are informative for drawing the inferences about the poten-
tial rationale for the use of Code flexibility, i.e. for weakening of the monitoring capacity and/or strengthening of the
directing capacity of the board. In particular, as argued above, the opportunism and the efficiency explanations gener-
ate opposite implications regarding expected performance consequences of index decreases, which underlie the main
test of H2a versus H2b. Moreover, while index increases are very unlikely to be driven by managerial opportunism,
prior literature on governance choices in the UK hints at efficiency motives being the driving force behind improve-
ments in board governance arrangements. For instance, Peasnell et al. (2003) and Young (2000) find that larger firms
having less than the suggested number of NEDs adjusted their board structures to meet the Cadbury recommenda-
tions after 1992. Similar trends in compliance and associated benefits are also documented by Dahya and McConnell
(2005, 2007) andHillier andMcColgan (2006).
3 SAMPLE AND INDEX CONSTRUCTION
3.1 Sample
The sample is constructed as the intersection of BoardEx and Thomson ONE Banker databases for UK listed compa-
nies.We analyse BoardEx data on board characteristics covering the years 1999–2008 andmerge itwith financial data
collected fromWorldscope and Datastream (retrieved via Thomson ONE Banker). Given the lead-lag structure of our
research design, we collect the corresponding financial data for the period, 1998–2009. While BoardEx coverage of
UK firms yields an unbalanced panel of 11,712 firm-years (corresponding to 2,212 companies), availability of data for
some financial variables restricts the sample size to 10,493 firm-years. In our analyses of portfolio performance, we
estimate the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) and employ UK factor-mimicking portfolios constructed by Gregory,
Tharyan, and Christidis (2013). Finally, in some of our analyses we employ data on analyst EPS forecasts from I/B/E/S
(retrieved viaWRDS).
1 Someof the costs ofmonitoring are indirect. Young (2000) echoes the concerns expressed among the business community at the timeof theCode's introduc-
tion that its emphasis on strengthening the control functionmay inhibit managerial enterprise and commercial competitiveness. Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel,
and Jackson (2008) highlight that compliance with governance codes involves opportunity costs such as directors’ time spent on governance issues instead of
business strategy, changes in managerial risk preferences, or proprietary costs (e.g. costs of disclosure of strategic information).
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TABLE 1 Sample descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
TSR 3.91 −1.88 60.39 −91.00 276.36
ROA −4.81 3.89 29.65 −194.55 35.55
ROE −7.34 6.79 110.49 −792.79 450.14
ROIC −6.38 5.88 51.10 −349.25 81.99
Tobin's Q 2.81 1.79 5.51 −16.45 40.16
Sales (£millions) 709.02 43.59 2311.61 0.00 15490.00
Ln(1+ Sales) 3.90 3.97 2.69 −3.67 9.71
Market capitalization (£millions) 846.73 57.53 2950.19 0.58 20649.28
Ln(1+Market capitalization) 4.24 4.05 2.22 −0.54 9.94
Total assets (£millions) 1868.53 62.43 9278.87 0.56 82651.00
Ln(1+ Total assets) 4.45 4.19 2.27 0.35 11.02
Free cash flow/Total assets −0.06 −0.01 0.23 −1.36 0.27
Leverage 20.49 8.80 30.16 −36.99 195.85
P/E ratio 1.47 8.50 175.80 −1214.39 1083.30
Intangibles/Total assets 0.20 0.10 0.23 0.00 0.99
Std. dev. TSR 16.75 11.74 16.09 2.27 105.36
EPS analyst forecast dispersion 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.30
CEO equity ownership 5.70 0.69 10.82 0.00 56.77
CEO equity-linkedwealth 6.17 1.45 10.82 0.00 56.78
CEO tenure 4.56 2.80 5.01 0.00 24.90
CEO age 50.66 50.00 7.79 33.00 70.00
CEO incentive pay 0.58 0.59 0.24 0.00 1.00
Note: All financial variables are winsorised at both ends of the distribution at the 1% level. TSR denotes total shareholder
return (which incorporates dividends and capital gains) and is expressed in percentage terms. Sales are expressed inmillions of
pounds. Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROA denotes return on assets, defined as the ratio
of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets and is expressed in percentage terms. ROE denotes return on
equity, defined as the ratio of net income to the book value of equity. ROIC is the return on invested capital, as defined by
theWorldscope database (i.e. (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense on Debt − Interest Capitalised) *
(1 − TaxRate)))/Average of Previous Year's and Current Year's (Total Capital + Last Year's Short Term Debt & Current Portion
of Long Term Debt) * 100). Tobin's Q is defined as the ratio of the sum of the book value of debt and market value of equity
to the book value of total assets. Market capitalisation and total assets are expressed in millions of pounds. Free cash flow
is defined by Worldscope as (funds from operations − capital expenditures − cash dividends paid)—the variable used here is
scaled by the book value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of book values of total debt and total assets. P/E ratio denotes
price-earnings ratio corresponding to the end of the year t. Intangibles/Total assets is the ratio of the net value of intangible
assets (as defined in Worldscope) to the value of total assets of the firm. Std. dev. of TSR is defined as the standard deviation
of monthly total shareholder returns in a particular year. EPS analyst forecast dispersion is the standard dispersion of 1-year-
ahead I/B/E/S analyst forecasts of earnings per share (EPS) scaled by per-share book value of assets at the beginning of the
period. CEO equity ownership is expressed as the ratio of the value of CEO's stock holdings to the total market capitalisation
of thefirmand is expressed in percentage terms.CEOequity-linkedwealth is expressed as the ratio of theCEO's equity-related
wealth (i.e. stocks, options, equity-related LTIPs) to the total market capitalisation of the firm and is expressed in percentage
terms. CEO tenure and CEO age are expressed in years. CEO incentive pay is defined as ratio of CEO performance-related pay
to the total pay earned by the CEO in a particular year.
Our data set thus covers the vast majority of market capitalisation of the London Stock Exchange (both of the main
market and of the AIM) for the period analysed. The analysis excludes firms for which BoardEx reports no executives
sitting on the board, i.e. mostly exchange-traded funds and similar financial companies. All other financial firms for
which data are available are included in the sample. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample (pooled across
10 years).
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3.2 Board governance index construction
Asalreadydiscussed,while studies examining thegovernance–performance linkbasedon individual governancemech-
anisms have found mixed results (e.g. Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002, for the UK; Agrawal & Knoeber,
1996, and Bhagat & Black, 1999, for the US), studies that have examined this link by developing an index measuring
the overall governance quality based on different aspects of governance (e.g. strength of shareholder rights in the case
of Gompers et al., 2003) have proved more successful. These include the initial work of Gompers et al. (2003), fol-
lowed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), Bhagat and Bolton (2008), Brown and Caylor (2006), and Renders et al.
(2010). All of these studies tend to find a positive link between indices capturing various aspects of a firm's governance
and variousmeasures of a firm's financial performance. A possible explanation for the success of the index approach in
governance–performance studies is that an index potentially captures better the overall strength of a particular aspect
of governance (say, shareholder rights inGompers et al., 2003) or the level ofmanagerial entrenchment (Bebchuk et al.,
2009), thus improving the power of the test of the aspect of governance under study.
While Gompers et al. (2003) focus on the strength of shareholder rights in the US (based on an index which counts
the number of anti-takeover provisions adopted by US firms), in this study, we focus on the strength of the moni-
toring capacity of the board (based on the number of board-related provisions of the UK Code adopted by a firm).
Our index takes guidance from the Code's recommendations related to different oversight functions of the board and
thus it allows us to comprehensively gauge the strength of the monitoring capacity of the board. Moreover, our fine-
tuned approach allows us to focus on the quality of governance arrangements both at the board as well as at the sub-
committee level. Chan and Li (2008) and Yeh et al. (2011) highlight the importance of the monitoring committee com-
position in performing its oversight function. Hence, the board governance index we develop here is not only rooted
in an established theory (namely agency theory), but the validity of its components is also supported by relevant prior
empirical evidence.
The Code's board recommendations dealing with different oversight functions (e.g. remuneration, audit, etc.) can
be seen as complementary aspects of strong governance arrangements at the board level. Thus, consistent with the
approach in the prior literature (e.g. Brown & Caylor, 2006; Gompers et al., 2003; Renders et al., 2010), we consider
the index components to be complementary and additive (cf. Bhagat, Bolton, & Romano, 2008). Moreover following a
large bodyof literature employing the index approach,we construct the indexbyweighting different provisions equally
(Bebchuk et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2003).
Panel A of Table 2 illustrates that a typical board has seven members. On average, about half of the board mem-
bers areNEDs, amajority of whom could also be classified as independent.2 Panel B of Table 2 provides the descriptive
statistics over the entire period for the provisions we take into account for constructing the board governance index
(mean values for each provision are presented in parentheses in the text below). In particular, the 1998 version of the
Code recommends that the board of directors should not be chaired by the company CEO (in approximately 16% of
the sample, however, this is the case). Moreover, at least one-third of the board members should be NEDs (91.36%),
the majority of whom should also be independent (74.43%). The board should have a senior independent member
other than the chair, either a deputy chair or a senior NED (56.50%). The board should have remuneration (89.00%),
audit (98.81%), and nomination (60.57%) committees, and the prior two committees should be headed by independent
NEDs (70.69% and 71.93%, respectively). The remuneration committee should be composed entirely of independent
NEDs (53.48%). The audit committee should be composed of NEDs only, the majority of whom should be indepen-
dent (78.59%). Finally, the nomination committee should be chaired either by the chairman of the board or by a NED
(33.15%) and themajority of its members should be NEDs (59.39%).
2 It is important to clarify at this point that the UK code makes a clear distinction between NEDs, or so-called outside directors in the US, and independent
NEDs (similar to unaffiliated outside directors in the US). For instance, the 2003 version of the Code stipulates that NEDs are deemed formally independent,
if they satisfy the following criteria: (1) a director has not previously been an employee of the company, (2) has no family ties with other board members, (3)
has no business link with the company, (4) receives no remuneration other than a fee for a directorship, (5) does not hold a cross-directorship, (6) does not
represent a significant shareholder, and (7) has not been on the board for more than nine years.
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TABLE 2 Board governance index components and key board characteristics (pooled sample averages)
Panel A: Key board characteristics
Board size (N) 6.99
Number of NEDs 3.66
Number of independent NEDs 2.58
Panel B: Averages for board governance index components
NoCEO/chair duality 84.44%
Percentage of NEDs on the board (at least 33%) 91.36%
Majority of NEDs independent 74.43%
Presence of deputy chair and/or senior NED 56.50%
Presence of remuneration committee 89.00%
Independent NED chairing remuneration committee 70.69%
Remuneration committee composed entirely of independent NEDs 53.48%
Presence of audit committee 98.81%
Independent NED chairing audit committee 71.93%
At least half of audit committeemembers are independent 78.59%
Presence of nomination committee 60.57%
NED or board chair is chairing nomination committee 33.15%
Majority of nomination committeemembers are NEDs 59.39%
Board governance index 9.38
Note: For eachof the indexprovisions, 1 corresponds to the casewhen the statement is true and0otherwise. Board governance
index is therefore the sumof all the provisions. Accordingly a firmwhich confirms to all provisions gets a score of 13, having the
best board composition and structure, while a firm scoring 0would have theworst designed board according to the UKCode.
For each of the provisions, we assign a value of 1 for compliance and 0 for non-compliance with the Code's rec-
ommendations, and define the board governance index for each firm-year as the sum of its scores on each of the 13
provisions. Hence, the index value can vary between 0 and 13, with 13 corresponding to full adherence to the Code's
recommendations related to board structure and composition. The high mean and median values of the board gover-
nance index (9.38 and 10.00, respectively) suggest that in the sample period firms are designing the board largely in
accordance with the Code's recommendations.
Our sample is an unbalanced panel. Therefore, in order to examine the temporal trends in the values of the index,
we estimate a simple fixed-effect panel data regression explaining the indexwith year fixed effects only. This approach
allows us to control for the sample composition changes by focusing only on within-firm variation in index values. We
then calculate model predictions from this regression, as depicted in Figure 1. It illustrates that the adherence to the
board-related Code recommendations (and thus the values of the index) increases on average, albeit at a slowing rate,
over the sample period. This finding complements prior evidence documenting a similar increase in adherence in peri-
ods immediately following theCadburyReport (e.g.Dahya&McConnell, 2007;Guest, 2008;Hillier&McColgan, 2006).
However, we also find that somefirms decrease the index in some years, an issue thatwe examine in greater detail later
in the paper.
4 ANALYSIS
4.1 Governance, operating performance and firm value
In this section we examine whether average and median values of operating performance and valuation indicators
differ between firms belonging to a portfolio of companies with the strongest board governance arrangements (as
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F IGURE 1 Impliedaveragevaluesofboardgovernance index [Colourfigure canbeviewedatwileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: The figure depicts model prediction from a simple fixed-effect panel data regression explaining the values of
board governance index with year fixed effects only.
indicated by high values of the board governance index) and those belonging to a portfolio of companieswith theweak-
est board governance arrangements, as postulated by H1. We apply a test similar to that reported by Gompers et al.
(2003). As governance provisions are recorded annually in the database, for each of the sample yearswe construct two
equally-weighted portfolios: firm-years where index values do not exceed 5 (which corresponds to the bottom quintile
of our sample) are classified as belonging to theweak governance portfolio, while observations where the index equals
13 (i.e. the top quintile) are classified as belonging to the strong governance portfolio.
Table 3 provides support for H1 with respect to measures of operating performance. The differences in industry-
adjusted3 indicators of operating performance between firms belonging to strong andweak governance portfolios are
highly significantboth contemporaneously and in the subsequent year.However, the average contemporaneousTobin's
Q of the best governance firms is not significantly different from that of the worst governance ones according to the t-
test result (although the difference is significant according to theWilcoxon test). Taken together, these findings suggest
thatwhile stronggovernancearrangements at theboard level are associatedwithpotentially reducedagencyproblems
and higher firm operating performance, investors do not seem to immediately recognise their value in full.4
4.2 Portfolio return analysis
While the analysis above has established a positive association between the board'smonitoring capacity andfirmoper-
ating performance, in this section we examine further whether there are significant differences in stock performance
of theweak and the strong governance portfolios defined above. In particular, we examine a zero-investment portfolio
which comprises a long position in the strong governance portfolio and a short position in the weak governance port-
folio. We then analyse total shareholder returns on these portfolios over the following year, i.e. we use governance
provisions in year t to construct portfolios and then analyse their performance in year (t+ 1).We usemonthly data and
assume that the portfolios are re-balanced monthly to keep equal weights of its constituents. Having computed the
portfolio returns, we investigate whether the differences in performance of the two portfolios could be attributed to
differing characteristics of these portfolios. In this attribution analysis we followGompers et al. (2003) and employ the
four-factor model by Carhart (1997) with the UK factor-mimicking portfolios constructed by Gregory et al. (2013).
Like Gompers et al. (2003) we remain agnostic as to whether the factors employed are proxies for risk and we
3 Industry definitions throughout the paper are based on the 17-industry classification of Fama and French (1997).
4 The governance index is strongly correlated with firm size, which may confound the effects of governance reported here. However, in untabulated analyses
(employing either propensity scorematching or sample split by firm size), we show that the relation between the governance index andperformance indicators
holds even after controlling for firm size and other observable firm characteristics.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































194 SHAUKAT AND TROJANOWSKI
TABLE 4 Four-factor model for weak and strong governance portfolios and for the arbitrage portfolio (based on










Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Alpha −1.80 −3.37*** 0.02 0.05 1.82 4.40***
(RM – RF) 0.20 1.57 0.23 2.46
* 0.03 0.30
SMB 0.18 1.39 0.17 1.82† −0.01 −0.07
HML 0.04 0.26 0.17 1.65 0.13 1.23
UMD −0.04 −0.39 0.10 1.24 0.14 1.67†




F-test F(4,115)= 1.96 F(4,115)= 3.45 F(4,115)= 1.15
Note: †, *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. The weak governance portfolio is defined
as an equally weighted portfolio comprising firms from the lowest quintile of the distribution of the board governance index.
The strong governance portfolio is defined as an equally weighted portfolio comprising firms from the highest quintile of the
distribution of the board governance index. Excess returns are total shareholder returns in excess of risk-free rate. The arbi-
trage portfolio is a zero-investment portfolio consisting of a long position in the strong governance portfolio and a short posi-
tion in theweak governance portfolio (as defined above). Portfolios are constructed annually, i.e. governance provisions in year
t are used to construct portfolios the performance of which is then analysed in year (t+1).
interpret the estimated intercept coefficient as the abnormal return in excess of what could have been achieved by
passive investment in the factor portfolios.
In untabulated analyses, we find that the portfolio of firms with strongest governance arrangements delivered
higher unadjusted total shareholder return, compared with the portfolio of firms with the weakest board governance
standards.Moreover, Table 4 illustrates that the discrepancy in performance of the two portfolios cannot be explained
by their differing characteristics (proxied by the four factor exposures). The results suggest that the portfolio of com-
panies falling short on strong governance arrangements in the preceding year underperforms a passive strategy of
investing in factor portfolios. Therefore, the investment strategy of buying companies with the best board governance
arrangements and of shorting firms with the weakest standards delivers a highly significant monthly alpha of 182 bp
over the sample period. The results suggest that in the UK, investors fail to recognise the value of strong governance
arrangements even more substantially than in the US market (as estimated by Gompers et al., 2003). Moreover, con-
trary to the findings of Bebchuk, Cohen, andWang (2013), who document convergence of returns on strong and weak
governance firm portfolios in the US at the very beginning of the twenty-first century, here we show that the corre-
sponding wedge in the UK is still present and very sizeable even inmore recent years.
4.3 Analysis of the changes in the index
The findings discussed so far are consistent with the view that firms with stronger governance arrangements tend
to enjoy stronger operating performance, but that investors do not appreciate the implications for firm value corre-
spondingly. However, as discussed earlier, adherence to the Code recommendations is a considered choice and there
are competing reasons for deviations from such arrangements. Non-compliance with the Code may be a step in the
right direction if driven by efficiency considerations (i.e. in situations where the perceived costs of monitoring out-
weigh potential benefits) in linewith the predictions of H2a. Alternatively, the reasons for reducing compliancemay be
opportunistic, consistent with H2b. Our tests below aim to discern thesemotives.
In Table 5 we examine the factors associated with the firms’ decisions to lower, maintain, or increase the val-
ues of their board governance index. In particular, we investigate whether CEO influence (proxied by the CEO share
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































196 SHAUKAT AND TROJANOWSKI
ownership and CEO age; cf. Boone et al., 2007; Core et al., 1999; Dedman, 2000) and information asymmetry vis-à-
vis outsiders (as reflected by standard deviation of stock returns or dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts, cf. Core
et al., 1999; Dittmar & Thakor, 2007; Guest, 2008; Lang & Lundholm, 1996) are positively associated with the like-
lihood of weakening board governance arrangements. In the ordered logit regressions explaining index changes we
control for the starting value of the governance index (to capture possible path-dependence in board arrangements, cf.
Hermalin &Weisbach, 1998) and a number of firm characteristics that are shown by the prior literature to be impor-
tant determinants of board structure and composition. These include firm performance, firm size, board size, free cash
flow, leverage, as well as year and industry fixed effects (cf. Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008).
We find the coefficients for all of the key variables of interest (i.e. measures of CEO influence and information
asymmetry) to be significant and negative as expected. Specifically, Table 5 shows that firms managed by CEOs with
larger equity stakes or those with older CEOs are more likely to decrease the index (although the effect of age is
not fully robust across the model specifications). The index is also more likely to decrease in firms characterised by
higher information asymmetries (i.e. riskier and more opaque firms) and those where the starting values of the index
are higher. In terms of other control variables, we find some evidence consistent with the efficiency motive: firms with
higher free cash flows are more likely to increase the index (presumably to strengthen the monitoring capacity of the
board).
At this stage however, neither opportunism nor efficiency can yet be ascertained as a factor explaining board
arrangements. In order to empirically distinguish between these two competing explanations, in Table 6 we examine
performance implications of the index changes. We calculate propensity scores (i.e. implied probabilities to decrease
the index) implied by Models 1–5 of Table 5 and use these to match an index-decreasing firm with a similar firm (i.e.
nearest neighbour according to the calculated propensity score) for which the index remains unchanged.We then cal-
culate the treatment effects (both the average treatment effect on the treated, ATT, and the average treatment effect,
ATE), where the treatment is defined as the index decrease between years t – 1 and t, on subsequent firm performance
(i.e. in year t + 1) using focal and control firm-years sharing a common support of the propensity score distribution
(cf. Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). The empirical approach followed allows us to take into account potential endogeneity
of the treatment (since we argue that the governance arrangements are a considered choice made by the firm) and
unobserved heterogeneity of the focal and control samples. In testing for significance of ATTs and ATEs, we employ a
bootstrapping procedure with 100 repetitions to obtain critical values for significance tests (Leuven & Sianesi, 2015).
Hypotheses 2a and 2bmake opposite predictions regarding the expected sign of the treatment effects. The former
postulates superior performance of the index-decreasing firms (and thus positive ATTs and ATEs), which is likely to
ensue due to realised efficiency gains. The latter implies negative performance consequences for the index-decreasing
firms (i.e. negative ATTs and ATEs), if the index change was driven by opportunistic motives. Table 6 illustrates that
the treatment effects for two out of the three operating performance indicators (i.e. ROA and ROIC, but not ROE) are
all negative and statistically significant (in line with H2b) for tests relying on propensity scores implied by Models 1–
4.5 Moreover, the three statistically significant treatment effects for Tobin's Q are all negative as well. As none of the
treatment effects analysed are significantly positive, we fail to find any support for H2a here.6
The results discussed here are also economically significant: for example, the index decrease is followed by a 3.2–
5.7 percentage point decrease (depending on themodel used to draw inferences) in ROA relative to performance firms
would achieve were they not to weaken their governance (cf. ATTs), and is associated with a 2.7–3.1 percentage gap in
ROA in year t+ 1 relative to the control sample firms (cf. ATEs). Hence, we conclude that the index decreases are likely
driven by opportunistic motives (corroborating H2b) and that they are followed by substantial adverse performance
consequences.
5 The results regarding treatment effects for ROE are insignificant and thus inconclusive. The same applies to all the results relying on propensity scores from
Model 5 (possibly due to small sample sizes available for the corresponding tests).
6 While our hypotheses pertain to index decreases, in untabulated analyses, we redefined the treatment and looked at index increases instead. Most of the
treatment effects are insignificant in this case. One possible interpretation could be thatwhileweakening of the boardmonitoring capacity could be detrimen-
tal to firm performance even in the relatively short run (given the immediately increased managerial discretion), the effect is not symmetrical, i.e. governance
improvements may not directly translate into corporate performance improvements.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































198 SHAUKAT AND TROJANOWSKI
Table 7 reports a further test of H2a against H2b and examines the arrangements that aremost likely to be changed
by firms reducing their board governance index. It indicates that the axe is fallingmost frequently on the independence
of the remuneration committee: 35% of the companies decreasing compliance weaken this aspect. This is followed by
appointment of non-independent chairs of keyboard committees, i.e. nomination (23%), remuneration (21%), and audit
(18%). The efficiency motivation for all of these changes seems quite implausible. Thus, taken together the results of
our analyses suggest that it is likely to be managerial opportunism rather than efficiency considerations which drive
firms’ decision regarding decreases in the board governance index. In otherwords, the evidence is consistent withH2b
rather than H2a: firms attempt to weaken the monitoring capacity of the board in situations where managerial power
is high. Even for firms characterised by high information asymmetries, it is quite likely that the reduction inmonitoring
capacity could be driven by managerial opportunism rather than efficiency, given that in such firms managers would
have a significant informational advantage, which they could use to their benefit (cf. Adams et al., 2010).
Moreover, the relatively lowoccurrence of companies suddenly falling short of sufficient proportion of independent
NEDs on their boards (11.3%) suggests that firms adopt more tacit techniques in weakening the board's monitoring
capacity.7 It seems that it is easier to ‘clip the wings’ of independent NEDs by reshuffling their positions on the board
rather than their outright removal. This finding is consistent with the insight of Alan J. Patricof, a leading US venture
capitalist, who argues that “[d]eep down [CEOs] really wish they didn't have boards. That's why, at the end of the day, most
independent directors get neutralized in one fashion or another” (Smale, Patricof, Henderson, Marcus, & Johnson, 1995,
p. 158). Our findings are also consistent with the conjecture of Chan and Li (2008), who argue that key committee
independence is far more important than the independence of the board per se.
5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
5.1 Alternative board governance index (new board governance index)
A new version of the Code stipulating a more stringent set of governance provisions regarding the design of the board
came into force in 2003. Specifically, the 2003 version calls for the majority of the board to consist of independent
NEDs, with the board chair position also to be held by an NED deemed independent at the time of appointment. The
purpose of these new provisions was to further improve board balance, i.e. the division of power at the top (by encour-
aging independence of board chair), as well as to further strengthen the monitoring capacity of the board (by not only
having more independent NEDs, but also requiring audit committee and remuneration committee to be composed
exclusively of independent NEDs).
We amend the board governance index accordingly and construct a new index (henceforth, the new board gover-
nance index), which takes into account these new recommendations.8 The new board governance index can also take
values ranging from 0 to 13 with higher values corresponding to stronger governance arrangements. Strikingly, the
trends observed here (not illustrated) mirror those for the board governance index (discussed earlier, see Figure 1)
almost perfectly and the two indices are quite highly correlated. This suggests that in the UK, as has been the philos-
ophy of the Code from the beginning, it is the prevailing best practice that is later codified rather than the other way
round. Finally, the conclusions of the analysis employing the new board governance index are fully in line with those
reported earlier.
7 In the robustness check section below, we document in more detail that index changes can only be partly explained by the changes in board size and
composition.
8 While the actual governance recommendations used to construct the new board governance index were only published in 2003, the analysis of this new
index and its link to subsequent corporate performance over the entire sample period is still meaningful. It allows us to examine whether investors perceived
differently board governance provisions recommended by the version of the Code in place at the time (i.e. 1998 version) and those, more exacting ones, going
beyond its letter. It also allows us to verify the claim by Henry (2008) that governance arrangements adopted by firms beyond those imposed by regulations
and common practices among firms in a given country have a strong, positive effect on firmperformance.Moreover, it provides an additional robustness check
of the previously tested relation. The results pertaining to the new board governance index are not reported, but available upon request.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































200 SHAUKAT AND TROJANOWSKI
5.2 Index changes versus sample and board composition effects
The analysis of within-firm index changes suggests that the overall trends in adherence to the Code regarding board
arrangements are not due to the sample composition effects. By construction, this approach requires tracking the same
firms over two consecutive years. We find that governance is less sticky than indicated by some earlier studies (e.g.
Arcot et al., 2010) and companies actually do change over time as far as their board arrangements are concerned.
Specifically, the average absolute change of the index is 0.67 per year, which is a much higher magnitude than the
average change of 0.6 over three-year intervals documented by Gompers et al. (2003) for their US index. This is not
entirely surprising: our index captures the quality of governance arrangements at the board level while the measure
constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) focuses on charter provisions. It is likely that board arrangements aremore flex-
ible and easier to modify than charter provisions. Moreover, we also find that in about a third of firm-years observed,
the value of the index actually changes compared to the previous year. This proportion varies between 28.61% in 2006
and 42.14% in 1999.
Table 8 documents that the board governance index components are positively correlated with each other. In par-
ticular, firms with boards comprising a larger proportion of (independent) NEDs tend to have key board committees
adhering more closely to the Code guidelines. To minimise the risk of inflating the effects of board composition and
independence, we amend the construction of the index and exclude provisions (2) and (3) capturing the proportion of
NEDs on the board and their independence.We then re-do the analysis using themodified index based on the remain-
ing 11 components. The results obtained (available upon request) are consistent with those reported in themain body
of thepaper, further highlighting the importanceof theoverall quality of board governance arrangements (in particular,
at the committee level) beyond just board independence studied bymost of the extant literature.
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) predict that the governance changes (in particular, those pertaining to the board)
are likely to be relatively permanent. On the other hand, Hillier and McColgan (2006) argue that firms change their
governance structures following ‘shocks’ such as CEO succession. These events could lead to temporary changes to
the board structure, e.g. a non-executive chair becoming an executive and taking over as an interimCEO. Such transient
board changes could be associated with substantial variations in firm performance. In order to rule out this transient
nature of changes (and the associated performance turbulence) as a possible explanation for the findings of Tables 5
and 6, we re-do the corresponding analyses focusing only on permanent changes to the index. We define a change as
permanent if the index changed between years t − 1 and t and the change was not reversed immediately afterwards
(i.e. between t and t+ 1). The results (available upon request) pertaining to both the antecedents and the performance
consequences of permanent index changes are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 5 and 6, further corrob-
orating support for H2b as opposed to H2a.9
Finally, we perform additional analyses (available on request) examining the changes in the size of the board, the
number of NEDs and of independent NEDs in firms that increase, keep unchanged, or decrease the index. In particular,
focusing on index decreases, we find that board size decreases in only 41.55% of index-decreasing firms. More impor-
tantly, only 36.76% of index-decreasing firms actually lower the number of NEDs on boards (while the corresponding
figure for independentNEDs is also less thanhalf, at 41.11%). Finally, only 15.94%of index-decreasing firms lower their
NEDs’ share of board seats below theCode-prescribedminimum. Taken together, we believe that the data provide suf-
ficient evidence that firms adopt tacit techniques in weakening the board'smonitoring capacity (i.e. ‘clipping thewings’
of (independent) NEDs by reshuffling their positions on the board) and that the index decreases in most cases are not
the result of (independent) NEDs’ removals, unexpected departures, or their shift to executive roles.
9 Unfortunately, statistical significance of someof the resultsweakens comparedwith Tables 5 and6,which is likely to be driven by smaller sample sizes, due to
data availability requirements. For instance, in order to classify a change as permanent or transient, three consecutive years of governance data are required
for firmswhere the index changes.Moreover, whilemost of the changes are indeed permanent, some are transient, which reduces the sample of the treatment
and control groups used in the calculation of treatment effects here.
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TABLE 9 The effects of board governance and other governance mechanisms on operating performance and firm
value














Regressors Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat
Board governance indext 0.58 4.14
*** −0.50 −0.75 0.72 2.91** 0.02 0.57
CEO equity-linkedwealtht 0.10 1.73
† −0.51 −1.80† 0.10 0.91 0.02 1.22
CEO incentive payt 5.94 5.04
*** 6.91 1.06 12.39 5.80*** 1.12 3.80***
Leveraget −0.00 −0.18 0.05 0.78 −0.04 −1.92† −0.00 −1.52
CEO tenuret 0.24 3.50
*** 0.36 1.02 0.43 3.46*** 0.02 1.42
LN(Board sizet) −5.91 −4.44*** −6.76 −1.08 −6.04 −2.54* 0.90 3.10**
LN(1+ Salest) 2.98 14.54*** 4.41 4.98*** 4.83 13.48*** −0.02 −0.44
Intangibles/Total assetst −17.00 −9.42*** −30.16 −3.94*** −22.14 −6.98*** −0.45 1.24
Intercept −13.98 −5.02*** −9.47 −0.74 −27.89 −5.67*** −1.73 −2.93**
Log-likelihood −18600.20 −26352.26 −21159.09 −12656.23
Wald test statistic 𝜒2(8)= 426.35*** 𝜒2(8)= 66.39*** 𝜒2(8)= 353.81*** 𝜒2(8)= 33.92***
No. of observations 4405 4414 4399 4417
No. of firms 1186 1188 1182 1188
Note: †, *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. The variables above are defined as in
Table 1. Themodels are estimated using the entire panel of 10 years asmultilevelmixed-effects linear regressionwith two-way
random effects (for years and firms). All the regressors are lagged one year, i.e. performance and firm value in year t + 1 are
modelled as a function of independent variables as measured in year t.
5.3 Board governance versus other governancemechanisms
Some prior studies (e.g. Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Conyon & Peck, 1998; Hillier & McColgan, 2006; Peasnell et al.,
2003; Young, 2000) suggest that governance arrangements at the board level might be related to the presence and
strength of other governancemechanisms. Thus, wemodel firm performance and firm value as functions of board gov-
ernance index, other governance mechanisms (i.e., CEO equity-linked wealth, CEO incentive pay, leverage), and con-
trol variables (i.e., CEO tenure, board size, firm size, and asset intangibility). All the regressors are lagged one year (and
thus, predetermined) to address the issue of possible endogeneity of the governance–performance link (see Adams
et al., 2010; Renders et al., 2010). To account for the panel structure of the dataset, we employmultilevel mixed-effects
linear regression with two-way random effects (for years and firms).
Table 9 illustrates that after controlling for other governance mechanisms, board monitoring capacity tends to be
associated with better operating performance, although this result does not hold uniformly across all three of the per-
formancemeasures: while the coefficients for the board governance index are positive and highly significant in regres-
sions explaining ROAandROIC, the corresponding estimate is not significantly different from zero inModel 7 (explain-
ing ROE). We do not find the effects of board monitoring capacity on firm value in Model 9 either. Regarding other
governance mechanisms, only CEO incentive pay is associated with both stronger operating performance and higher
firm value. Moreover, we find that larger companies, those managed by longer-tenured CEOs, those having smaller
boards and less intangible asset base, tend to outperform their industry peers.
In order to furthermitigate potential endogeneity concerns, in Table 10we estimate instrumental-variable random-
effect panel regression model counterparts of Models 6–9 from Table 9. In 2003 the UK Corporate Governance Code
was revised (see above), which provides us with an exogenous shock allowing us to examine the effects of board
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TABLE 10 The effects of board governance and other governance mechanisms on operating performance and firm
value (controlling for potential endogeneity of the board governance index)














Regressors Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat
Board governance indext 3.67 5.93
*** 8.44 2.05* 4.35 4.18*** 0.24 0.96
CEO equity-linkedwealtht 0.15 2.08
* 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.66 0.03 1.50
CEO incentive payt 6.08 5.13
*** 7.27 0.97 12.34 5.86*** 1.23 3.85***
Leveraget 0.00 0.41 0.05 0.70 −0.03 −1.36 −0.00 −1.59
CEO tenuret 0.23 3.31
*** −0.30 −0.67 0.33 2.65** 0.02 1.27
LN(Board sizet) −9.02 −6.12*** −36.32 −3.86*** −11.66 −4.45*** 0.68 1.77†
LN(1+ Salest) 0.50 1.56 0.27 0.12 1.11 2.00* −0.12 −1.00
Intangiblest/Total assetst −23.46 −11.10*** −66.99 −5.27*** −32.72 −8.35*** −0.41 −1.09
Intercept −26.93 −5.20*** −12.65 −0.39 −35.01 −3.63*** −3.15 −1.86†
R2-overall 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00
Wald test statistic 𝜒2(8)= 240.99*** 𝜒2(8)= 47.30*** 𝜒2(8)= 155.92*** 𝜒2(8)= 34.21***
No. of observations 4405 4414 4399 4417
No. of firms 1186 1188 1182 1188
Note: †, *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. Post-2003 dummy equals 0 for obser-
vations corresponding to years up to and including 2002, and 1 for those from year 2003 onwards. This indicator variable is
used as an instrument for the board governance index. All the other variables above are defined as in Table 1. The models are
estimated using the entire panel of 10 years as random-effect instrumental-variable panel regressions. All the regressors are
lagged one year, i.e. performance and firm value in year t+ 1 are modelled as a function of independent variables as measured
in year t.
monitoring capacity on firm performance.10 Therefore, we use the post-2003 dummy as an instrument for the index in
Models 6A–9A in Table 10.
Overall, Table 10 documents that, after controlling for the strength of other governance mechanisms and potential
endogeneity of the board governance index, board monitoring capacity is strongly and significantly associated with
better operatingperformance (for all performance indicatorsused). Consistentwith theearlier results,weagainfindno
statistically significant association between board monitoring capacity and firm value.While in Table 10 we document
that CEO equity-linked wealth and incentive pay are associated with better operating performance and higher firm
value, the effects of other variables examined here are in line with those reported in Table 9 earlier.
5.4 Other robustness checks
First, we examine if the phenomenon of higher stock returns for companies with stronger corporate governance
arrangements is not due to observable firm characteristics. In the regression framework employing multilevel mixed-
effects linear regression with two-way random effects (for years and firms), we model annualised TSR as a function of
the lagged board governance index, a vector of firm-year specific control variables (i.e. profitability, firm size, leverage,
the price-to-earnings ratio, and asset intangibility) lagged one year, and industry and year fixed effects. In line with the
results reported in the main body of the paper, these additional analyses (not reported, but available upon request)
10 Whilewe follow the approach similar to that ofDahya et al. (2002), who treat theCadburyReport as an exogenous shock,we acknowledge that this assump-
tion of exogeneity is rather strong. Both in the case of the Cadbury Report and subsequent governance reforms in the UK (including the 2003 revision of the
Code), consultations were invited in advance of publication and both events allowed firms time to respond in advance of publication of the Code updates.We
would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this issue.
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again reveal a significant positive relationship between the TSR and the board governance index, after controlling for
firm characteristics, as well as industry and year fixed effects. Hence, all else equal, companies with stronger board
arrangements tend to deliver higher returns.
Second, instead of defining weak and strong governance portfolios using absolute thresholds (as explained in Sec-
tion 4.1), we also considered portfolios based on relative thresholds, i.e. weak (strong) governance portfolio comprising
companies belonging to the bottom (top) quintile of the board governance index distribution in a particular year. The
resulting cutoff points vary substantially depending on the year. For instance, in years 1999–2001, companieswith the
board governance index value of 7 or less end up in the weak governance portfolio, while for years 2006–2008, the
corresponding criterion is that the board governance index value is 4 or less only. The results of analyses employing
these alternatively defined portfolios are virtually identical to those reported earlier in the paper.
Third, we find that our results are not driven by the inclusion of the financial firms in the sample (i.e. industry 16
in the 17-industry classification of Fama & French, 1997). While the exclusion of these firms considerably reduces the
sample size, the key results of the paper carry through even in such a restricted sub-sample.
Finally, our sample covers three distinctive sub-periods, i.e. the peak and collapse of the so-called dotcom bubble,
the period of credit expansion from 2003 to 2006, and the onset of the global financial crisis from late 2007 until the
end of the sample. In untabulated analyseswe find that the results robustly hold in each of these three sub-periods and
are not driven by observations from any of them.
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides new evidence on the association between board monitoring capacity and firm performance for a
large panel of UK listed companies. It also makes a substantial contribution to the literature on the antecedents and
consequences of board structure and composition in the UK and beyond.
First, we refine the methodological approach followed by a number of prior UK board-related studies (e.g. Mac-
Neil & Li, 2006; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002) and provide novel empirical evidence. Employing a
large longitudinal data set, we capture the overall strength of the monitoring capacity of the board by developing a
board governance index. This approach differs from the relevant priorUK researchwhich is largely cross-sectional and
studies associations between individual monitoring mechanisms on the board and firm performance. The first set of
results pertains to the trends in the quality of board governance arrangements. Consistentwith prior related evidence,
mostly pertaining to earlier periods (e.g. Dahya & McConnell, 2007; Guest, 2008; Hillier & McColgan, 2006; Peasnell
et al., 2003; Renders et al., 2010; Young, 2000), we find that adherence to the board-related recommendations of the
Code rises over time albeit at a slowing rate and even in the final sample years the adherence falls short of 100%. How-
ever, we also observe cross-sectional differences in this respect with a number of companies actually decreasing the
board governance index, at least in some years.
Second, consistent with H1, we find a statistically as well as economically significant positive association between
the board governance index and different measures of a firm's operating performance. However, our analyses indi-
cate that share prices do not fully factor in the value of strong governance arrangements: stock returns of firms with
strong boardmonitoring arrangements are consistently higher than those of companieswithweaker boardmonitoring
arrangements. This pattern cannot be explained by differing characteristics of the constituents of the two portfolios.
Thus, UK investors in the first decade of the twenty-first century appear to remain indifferent to the value of strong
governance arrangements, in amanner similar to the US investors a decade earlier (cf. Gompers et al., 2003).
Third, the flexibility offered by the voluntary nature of the Code is based on the expectation that firms will choose
their governance structures efficiently. While we acknowledge that cost-benefit considerations could be plausible
antecedents of firm decisions to determine their board structures (as postulated by H2a), we also propose and test
an alternative explanation focusing on managerial opportunism (and formalised as H2b). Our empirical evidence sup-
ports the latter explanation. While we find that the board governance index is likely to decrease in riskier or more
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opaque firms (where the costs of monitoring are likely to be higher due to information asymmetries) and in firms with
lower free cashflows (where thebenefits ofmonitoring are likely to be smaller), similar decreases are also likely in firms
where the influence of the CEO is considerable (consistent with the managerial power view). We then document that
performance consequences of index decreases are negative: that is, performance of index-decreasing firms is signifi-
cantly worse than that of the control sample (as implied by treatment effects based on propensity score-matched sam-
ples). These results are in linewith the predictions of H2b and are inconsistent with the logic underlying H2a: were the
governance adjustmentsmade for efficiency reasons, theywould be associatedwith positive subsequent performance
outcomes. Thus, the paper not only makes an empirical contribution to the literature on the antecedents of board gov-
ernance arrangements, it also proposes an alternative approach for drawing inferences about these antecedents, com-
pared to that followed by prior related studies (e.g. Boone et al., 2007).
Moreover, the board governance index decreases aim at weakening the monitoring capacity of the board (rather
than strengthening its directing capacity): we find that it is most often the independence of key boardmonitoring com-
mittees (particularly, the remuneration committee), which is sacrificed when the index decreases. This result is in con-
trast to the implications of prior findings, particularly those of Hillier andMcColgan (2006), Peasnell et al. (2003), and
Young (2000), who on the whole suggest that firms use the Code flexibility in an efficient manner, particularly when it
comes to the use of NEDs, including independent NEDs. Taken together, our results suggest that while on the whole
adherence to the Code's voluntary recommendations has strengthened themonitoring capacity of the boards of listed
firms in UK, firms at times have also behaved opportunistically and abused the Code's flexibility.
Our study has limitations. First, our empirical analyses are based on a single country setting. Testing our infer-
ences regarding opportunistic use of soft regulation in a multi-country context would lend further support to our
findings. Second, it is worth noting here that we focus mainly on one of the many roles of boards, namely oversight.
While we briefly touch upon the stewardship role of the managers (cf. Donaldson & Davis, 1991) in our analysis on
the use of Code flexibility, we are silent on the important ‘service’ role of the non-executive directors (as per resource
dependency theory, Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, given our focus on the Code's board-related recommenda-
tions, analysis of these roles in any detail is beyond the scope of this study. It could be fruitfully addressed by future
research.
The paper has a number of important implications. First, the arguments motivating our hypotheses meet the pos-
tulate that “a model of corporate governance should be consistent with both perspectives; it should explain both how some
boards are active monitors of management, yet how some CEOs are able to avoid scrutiny” (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998,
p. 111). Our theoretical discussion and related findings therefore provide a more nuanced and realistic picture of the
dynamics of board governance role than that provided by many prior studies. Future work can explore these board
nuances and their dynamics in different institutional settings.
Second, if companies at times indeedmake opportunistic use of the Code flexibility, then it questions the voluntary
approach to governance regulation adopted in the UK, as in many other jurisdictions. Therefore, we challenge to some
extent the conclusions reached by Arcot and Bruno (2007), who stress the benefits of flexibility offered by the volun-
tary governance regime. There may be scope for a more mandatory approach to governance, at least in some aspects
of the Code recommendations.
Third, given that the opportunistic decrease in adherence to the Code is mostly achieved by the weakening of inde-
pendence of key board monitoring committees (rather than a simple reduction of the number of independent NEDs
on the board), our findings suggest that it is not just the proportion of independent directors that matters for board
effectiveness, but, perhaps more importantly, where these directors sit on the board (corroborating the arguments of
Chan & Li, 2008, and Yeh et al., 2011). Our findings thus make an empirical contribution to the growing literature on
the design of the structure and composition of the effective board (Adams et al., 2010). If, as argued above, some of the
Code's recommendations were to be mandated, the composition of its key monitoring committees appears a worthy
target of such action.
Finally, while in this study we focus solely on the financial performance implications of a board's monitoring capac-
ity, future research can not only fruitfully examine the link between such a board governance index and firm perfor-
mance in other jurisdictions adopting a UK-type code approach, but also between such an index and other board and
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organisational outcomes includingCEOcompensation, CEO turnover, corporate acquisition activity, earningsmanage-
ment, audit quality, quality of corporate reporting and corporate social responsibility-related outcomes among others.
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